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ABSTRACT
We explore the design of an effective crowdsourcing system
for an M -ary classification task. Crowd workers complete
simple binary microtasks whose results are aggregated to give
the final decision. We consider the scenario where the work-
ers have a reject option so that they are allowed to skip mi-
crotasks when they are unable to or choose not to respond to
binary microtasks. We present an aggregation approach us-
ing a weighted majority voting rule, where each worker’s re-
sponse is assigned an optimized weight to maximize crowd’s
classification performance.
Index Terms— Classification, crowdsourcing, distributed
inference, reject option, spammers
1. INTRODUCTION
Crowdsourcing provides a new framework to utilize dis-
tributed human wisdom to solve problems that machines can-
not perform well, like handwriting recognition, paraphrase
acquisition, audio transcription, and photo tagging [1–4].
In spite of the successful applications of crowdsourcing, the
relatively low quality of output remains a key challenge [5–7].
Several methods have been proposed to deal with the
aforementioned problems [8–15]. A crowdsourcing task is
decomposed into microtasks that are easy for an individual
to accomplish, and these microtasks could be as simple as
binary distinctions [8]. A classification problem with crowd-
sourcing, where taxonomy and dichotomous keys are used
to design binary questions, is considered in [9]. New ag-
gregation rules that mitigate the unreliability of the crowd
and improve the crowdsourcing system performance are in-
vestigated in [10, 11]. In our research group, we employed
binary questions and studied the use of error-control codes
and decoding algorithms to design crowdsourcing systems
for reliable classification [9, 12]. A group control mechanism
where the reputation of the workers is taken into consideration
to partition the crowd accordingly into groups is presented
in [13, 14]. Group control and majority voting techniques
are compared in [15], which reports that majority voting is
more cost-effective on less complex tasks. A weighted voting
framework is developed in [16]. However, prior informa-
tion of the individual workers is assumed known, which is
unrealistic in most practical situations.
In past work on classification via crowdsourcing, crowd
workers were required to provide a definitive yes/no response
to binary microtasks. We consider the design of crowdsourc-
ing systems where the workers are not forced to make a bi-
nary choice when they are unsure of their response and can
choose not to respond. Crowd workers may be unable to an-
swer questions for a variety of reasons such as lack of ex-
pertise. As an example, in mismatched speech transcription,
i.e., transcription by crowd workers who do not know the lan-
guage, workers may not be able to perceive the phonological
dimensions they are tasked to differentiate [17]. We investi-
gated the optimal aggregation rule where the workers have a
reject option so that they are allowed to skip microtasks when
they are unable to or choose not to respond [18, 19].
In this paper, we extend our work [18, 19] by further tak-
ing the spammers’ effect on the system into consideration. We
study the scenario where spammers also exist in the crowd,
who participate in the task only to earn some free money with-
out regard to the quality of their answers. The spammers sub-
mit answers with random guesses. We propose an optimal ag-
gregation rule to combat the spammers’ effect on system per-
formance, which falls within the category of weighted major-
ity voting methods, but where no prior individual information
is needed. Simulation results show significant performance
improvement by the proposed method.
2. CROWDSOURCINGWITH A REJECT OPTION
Consider the situation where W workers take part in an M -
ary object classification task. Each worker is asked N sim-
ple binary questions, termed as microtasks, which eventually
lead to a classification decision among the M classes. We
investigate independent microtask design and, therefore, we
have N = dlog2Me independent microtasks of equal diffi-
culty. The workers submit results that are combined to give
the final decision. Here, we consider the microtasks as simple
binary questions and the worker’s answer to a single micro-
task is conventionally represented by either “1” (Yes) or “0”
(No) [9,20]. Thus, thewth worker’s ordered answers to all the
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microtasks form an N -bit word, which is denoted by aw. Let
aw(i), i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N} represent the ith bit in this vector.
In our previous work [18, 19], we considered a more gen-
eral problem setting where the worker has a reject option of
skipping the microtasks. We denote this skipped answer as λ,
whereas the “1/0” (Yes/No) answers are termed as definitive
answers. Due to the variability of different workers’ back-
grounds, the probability of submitting definitive answers is
different for different workers. Let pw,i represent the prob-
ability of the wth worker submitting λ for the ith microtask.
Similarly, let ρw,i be the probability that aw(i), the ith answer
of the wth worker, is correct given that a definitive answer
has been submitted. Due to the variabilities and anonymity
of workers, we study crowdsourcing performance when pw,i
and ρw,i are realizations of certain probability distributions,
which are denoted by FP (p) and Fρ (ρ) respectively. The
corresponding means are expressed as m and µ.
Let H0 and H1 denote the hypotheses where “0” or “1”
is the true answer for a single microtask, respectively. For
simplicity of performance analysis, H0 and H1 are assumed
equiprobable for every microtask. The crowdsourcing task
manager or a fusion center (FC) collects theN -bit words from
W workers and performs fusion based on an aggregation rule.
In our previous work [18, 19], we proposed a novel
weighted majority voting method for crowdsourced classi-
fication, which was derived by solving the following opti-
mization problem
maximize EC [W]
subject to EO [W] = K
(1)
where EC [W] denotes the crowd’s average weight contri-
bution to the correct class and EO [W] denotes the average
weight contribution to all the possible classes that is con-
strained to remain a constant K. For ith bit, every worker’s
answer is assigned the derived optimal weight, and a decision
is then obtained. We showed that this method significantly
outperforms the widely-used simple majority voting proce-
dure.
In this paper, we investigate the impact of spammers on
system performance. The weight assignment scheme is de-
veloped by solving problem (1) as well.
3. OPTIMAL BEHAVIOR FOR THE MANAGER
In typical crowdsourcing setups, workers are simply paid in
proportion to the number of tasks they complete [21]. Most
likely, the spammers will complete all the microtasks with
random guesses. A payment mechanism was proposed in the
crowdsourcing system with a reject option to incentivize the
crowd, where responses with even the slightest error are as-
sociated with minimum payment possible [21]. This mech-
anism promotes skipping of all the microtasks by the spam-
mers. Therefore, we assume that MA spammers complete all
the microtasks and the rest of the M0 spammers skip all the
microtasks, making a total of M spammers in the crowd of
size W . To combat the spammers’ effect on the system per-
formance, we develop the aggregation rule on the manager’s
side with a new weight assignment scheme to maximize the
weight assigned to the correct class.
Proposition 1. To maximize the average weight assigned
to the correct classification element, the weight for the wth
worker’s answer is given by
Ww =
[
(W −M)µn + MA
2N (1−m)N
δ (n−N)
]−1
, (2)
where n is the number of definitive answers that the wth
worker submits, and δ(·) is the Dirac delta function.
Proof. When there are M spammers in the crowd with M0
skipping and MA completing all the questions, the expected
weight contributed to the correct class is given by
EC [W] =
W−M∑
w=1
Ep,ρ
[
N∑
n=0
Wwρ(n)Pλ(n)
]
+
M0∑
w=1
Ww(n = 0)
+
MA∑
w=1
1
2N
Ww(n = N)
=
N∑
n=0
(W −M)Wwµn
(
N
n
)
(1−m)nmN−n
+
N∑
n=0
M0Wwδ(n) +
N∑
n=0
MA
2N
Wwδ(n−N)
=
N∑
n=0
(W −M)WwµnP(n) +
N∑
n=0
M0
P(0)
WwP(n)δ(n)
+
N∑
n=0
MA
2NP(N)
WwP(n)δ(n−N)
=
N∑
n=0
WwS(n)P(n), (3)
where P(n) =
(
N
n
)
(1−m)nmN−n, and
S(n) = (W −M)µn + M0
mN
δ(n) +
MA
2N (1−m)N δ(n−N).
Note that
N∑
n=0
P(n) = 1, and then (3) is upper-bounded
using Cauchy-Schwarz inequality as follows:
EC [W] =
N∑
n=0
WwS(n)P(n)
≤
√√√√ N∑
n=0
(WwS(n))2P(n)
√√√√ N∑
n=0
P(n) = α. (4)
Also note that equality holds in (4) only if
WwS(n)
√
P(n) = α
√
P(n)
where α is a positive constant, and WwS(n) = α
Therefore, the optimal behavior for the manager in terms
of the weight assignment is obtained as
Ww=
[
(W−M)µn+M0
mN
δ (n)+
MA
2N (1−m)N
δ (n−N)
]−1
.
Note that if a worker submits no definitive answers, i.e.
n = 0, the corresponding weight assigned is (W − M +
M0
mN
)−1. However, since this worker skips all the questions,
his/her decision for a certain question is not taken into con-
sideration at the fusion center and, without loss of generality,
the corresponding weight can be set equal to zero. Therefore,
the weight assignment for the scheme can be expressed as
Ww =
[
(W −M)µn + MA
2N (1−m)N
δ (n−N)
]−1
.
Compared to the weight assignment for an honest crowd
[18], the derived scheme differs in terms of the weight as-
signed to the workers who complete all the microtasks. If
the spammers skip all the microtasks, the weight assignment
scheme remains the same, which is intuitively true as no ran-
dom guesses are received by the manager from the spammers
and the crowd can be considered as honest as well. Other-
wise, the weight assignment scheme differs from the scheme
given in [18].
3.1. Parameter Estimation
In order to act optimally, the manager has to estimate sev-
eral parameters before the weight assignment can be adopted.
Specifically, one has to estimate µ,m,MA,M0 before he/she
can proceed with the optimal weight assignment. We can
employ either the Training-based or Majority-voting based
method to estimate µ as stated in our previous work [18].
Calculating the ratio of the sum of skipped questions over all
the questions attempted by the crowd gives the estimated m.
Based on the analysis in previous sections, the answers with
all questions completed or skipped should be discarded for
estimation.
We hereby jointly address the estimation of M0 and
MA by using the maximum likelihood estimation (MLE)
method. First, as we employ G gold standard questions, a
worker has to respond to N + G microtasks. Let WN+G
denote the number of workers submitting N + G definitive
answers, and W0 denote the number of workers skipping all
the microtasks. Given the numbers of spammers respectively
completing and skipping all the microtasks, MA and M0,
the joint probability distribution function of WN+G and W0,
f(WN+G,W0|MA,M0), is expressed in (6), where mˆ is the
estimated m.
Therefore, by the MLE method, the estimates of MA and
M0, which are denoted by MˆA and Mˆ0 respectively, can be
obtained as{
MˆA, Mˆ0
}
= argmax
{MA,M0}≥0
f(WN+G,W0|MA,M0). (5)
Once the manager has the estimation results µˆ, mˆ, MˆA,
and Mˆ0, he/she can optimally assign the weight to the work-
ers’ answers for aggregation.
3.2. Performance Analysis
In this section, we characterize the performance of such a
crowdsourcing classification framework, where the task man-
ager behaves optimally, in terms of the probability of correct
classification Pc. Note that we have an overall correct classi-
fication only when all the bits are classified correctly.
Proposition 2. The probability of correct classification Pc in
the crowdsourcing system is
Pc =
[1
2
+
1
2
∑
S
(
W
Q
)
(F (Q)− F ′(Q))
+
1
4
∑
S′
(
W
Q
)
(F (Q)− F ′(Q))
]N
(7)
with
F (Q)=mq0
N∏
n=1
(1−µ)q−nµqn(Cn−1N−1(1−m)nmN−n)q−n+qn
and
F ′(Q)=mq0
N∏
n=1
(1−µ)qnµq−n(Cn−1N−1(1−m)nmN−n)q−n+qn
where
Q = {(q−N , q−N+1, . . . qN ,M ′A,M ′′A) :
N∑
n=−N
qn =W −MA −M0,M ′A +M ′′A =MA},
with natural numbers qn, M ′A, and M
′′
A,
S=
{
Q :
N∑
n=1
qn − q−n
(W−M)µn+(M
′
A−M ′′A)
2N (1−m)N
MA
>0
}
,
S′ =
{
Q :
N∑
n=1
qn−q−n
(W−M)µn+(M
′
A−M ′′A)
2N (1−m)N
MA
=0
}
,
and
(
W
Q
)
= W !∏N
n=−N qn!
.
Proof. Due to the space limit, we only give the result here.
The proof will be given in the extended version of the paper
and a similar proof can be found in our previous paper [18].
f(WN+G,W0|MA,M0) =
(
W0 −M0
W −M0 −MA
)
(mˆN+G)W0−M0(1− mˆN+G)W−W0−MA
·
(
WN+G −MA
W −W0 −MA
)
(1− mˆ)(N+G)(WN+G−MA) (1− (1− mˆ)N+G)W−WN+G−W0 (6)
3.3. Simulation Results
In this section, we present the simulation results to illustrate
the performance of the proposed schemes. W = 50 workers
participate in a crowdsourcing task with N = 3 microtasks
and G = 3 gold standard questions. FP (p) is chosen as a
uniform distribution U(0, 1), and let Fρ(ρ) be a uniform dis-
tribution expressed as U(x, 1) with 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, and thus we
can have µ varying from 0.5 to 1.
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Fig. 1. Performance comparison with spammers.
We present the performance comparison with spammers
in Fig. 1, where the quality of the crowd µ varies. We plot
the performance of three different weight assignment meth-
ods. The first one is what we derived in this section, which
is referred to as the optimal behavior for the manager with
spammers. The second is the one that we derived in [18],
which is given by Ww = µ−n. Since we do not assume the
knowledge of prior information regarding individuals, the ex-
isting weighted majority voting methods fail to work in this
setting. Thus, we choose the conventional simple majority
voting without a reject option for comparison. For illustra-
tion, there are 14 spammers in a crowd of 50 workers, and we
have 7 spammers completing all the questions and the other
7 skipping all the questions. When µ = 0.5, the workers
are making random guesses even if they believe that they are
able to respond with definitive answers. In such a case, the
choice of weight assignment schemes does not make a differ-
ence, and therefore, the three curves merge at this point. The
method with optimal behavior for the manager with spam-
mers outperforms the other two, while the simple majority
voting without a reject option performs the worst.
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Fig. 2. Performance comparison with various spammers.
In Fig. 2, we plot the performance comparison when the
number of spammers changes. We set that M0 = MA, and
µ is fixed at 0.75. As we can observe, the method with opti-
mal behavior for the manager with spammers yields the best
performance. When the number of spammers is small, the
simple majority voting method is outperformed by the one
with optimal behavior for the manager with honest workers.
However, this is not the case when the number of spammers
is large. The reason is that with honest workers, the manager
assigns a greater weight to the worker with a larger number of
definitive answers. In the regime where MA is large, which
means the number of spammers completing all the questions
is large, the impact from the spammers is much more severe
on the performance with such a weight assignment scheme.
Thus, the corresponding performance degrades significantly.
4. CONCLUSION
We have studied a novel framework of crowdsourcing sys-
tem for classification, where an individual worker has the re-
ject option and can skip a microtask if he/she has no defini-
tive answer. We investigated the impact of the spammers in
the crowd on the crowdsourcing system performance. We
derived the optimal strategy for the manager, where an op-
timal weighted aggregation rule for the crowdsourcing was
proposed to combat the spammers’ influence.
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